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Abstract 
A partial-refund policy is superior to a "full money-back policy when 
a seller faces a significant amount of opportunistic return behavior-i.e., 
consumers order a product for short term usage only to return it for a 
refund later. In a partial-refund policy, the seller charges a rent (the 
nonrefundable portion of price) to those who return the product; this 
discourages opportunistism, but also penalizes consumers who only 
return because merchandise is unsatisfactory. The optimal partial 
refund policy balances this tradeoff. Profit is higher under the partial 
refund policy because of a lower number of returns and because a 
higher price can be charged. Mail-order clothing and personal computer 
industries demonstrate that catalogers typically offer only partial 
refunds. 
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1. Introduction 
Today's retailers strive to make buying easy for consumers, 
offering products not only through traditional stores, but also 
via mail-order catalogs, television, and the Internet. To stimulate 
orders, many retailers advertise that they offer 100% money- 
back guarantees, in which consumers can return products for a 
full refund, for any reason, "no questions asked." 
While returning a n  item is  a common action taken by 
dissatisfied consumers, according to recent reports, some 
consumers abuse liberal return policies by buying products with 
no intention of keeping them (Fenvessy, 1992; Hess and 
Mayhew, 1997; Longo, 1995). The resulting losses to retailers 
have been recently estimated to be in the magnitude of $1 billion 
annually, and Table 1 provides examples of abusive returns 
documented by Longo (1995) and Neuborne (1996). 
To stop consumers from borrowing products-using items 
before returning them-retailers seek ways to crack down on 
excessive returns. This paper models incomplete money-back 
guarantees (called partial refunds) designed to deal with these 
abusive returns. The model allows u s  to compare full- and 
partial-refund policies and to demonstrate why partial refunds 
are more profitable when a seller faces the kind of consumer 
opportunism mentioned above. We find that  under partial 
refunds, the seller should raise price and reduce the refund to 
discourage product orders from marginal consumers (those with 
low value for the product who order products only to return 
Table 1. Cases of Abusive Returns 
Products Abusive Returns 
Radar and video cameras Bought for vacation trips 
Everung wear Bought for proms and class reunions 
Patio-furniture and air conditioners Bought for the summer season 
Laptop computers Bought by students before finals 
Hiking boots and carnplng equipment Bought for a camping trip 
Snow blowers Bought for the winter season 
Compact discs Recorded and returned 
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them for a refund). The partial refund should not be too low, as 
this discourages good customers who intend to keep products 
that match their needs. Partial refunds are not just theoretical 
possibilities, but exist in practice, as illustrated by two empirical 
cases in Section V. 
How is this paper different from previous research on product 
warranties and money-back policies? Models of product 
warranties typically assume that consumers cannot discern 
quality before purchase because of high search costs or biased 
information (Kendall and Russ, 1975; Heal, 1977; C o ~ l l e  and 
Hausman, 1979; Grossman, 1981; Plafrey and Romer, 1983; 
Cooper and Ross, 1985; Matthews and Moore, 1987; Lutz, 1988; 
Welling, 1989; Menezes and Currim, 1992; Padmanabhan and 
Rao, 1993; and Moorthy and Srinivasan, 1995). These papers 
then focus on identifying conditions under which the warranties 
will be profitable and economically efficient in terms of 
production, quality, information, and resources required for 
contract enforcement. The underlying assumption is  that  
warranties are honored only when product failure to function 
can be objectively verified by buyers and sellers. Retailers, 
however, typically offer money-back guarantees based on 
consumers' subjective product evaluations. That is, consumers 
can obtain refunds "no-questions-asked." The implications of 
such liberal return policies have not been fully investigated. 
Mann and Wissink (1990) compared money-back to 
replacement-warranty contracts and argued that money-back 
warranties are more profitable if the cost of replacing defective 
products is high. Davis, Gerstner, and Hagerty (1995) showed 
that full money-back guarantees can be more profitable and 
economically efficient than selling "as-is" (without a warranty), 
even when it is known that the product functions perfectly. This 
occurs when retailers obtain salvage value from returned 
merchandise that is greater than the consumer's salvage value 
net of returning costs. However, they did not investigate partial 
refunds a s  a means to control abusive returns and, in their 
model, such returns do not prevail in equilibrium. 
In contrast, in our model, abusive returns occur in equilib- 
rium. It will be shown that, under such opportunistic behavior 
(by consumers), a partial-refund policy is more profitable than a 
full-refund policy for the following reason. Under full refund, 
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consumers can borrow the product for free; with partial refunds, 
the retailer not only sells to people who keep the product, but 
also rents to customers who return the product. The best policy 
consists of a price and partial-refund that allows the seller to 
optimize the level of selling and renting. That is, the seller avoids 
consumers with excessive opportunistic behavior, but retains 
enough good customers who order with intentions to buy. 
2. Elements of the Model 
Consider a seller who offers a product at price P. The product 
may or may not satisfy a particular consumer's needs. This 
uncertainty is modeled with a random variable. If the product is 
a good match with the consumer's needs, its value to the 
consumer is v; if it is a mismatch, its value is 0.  Let m denote 
the probability of a match and 1-m denote the probability of a 
mismatch. The parameter m can also be viewed as a measure of 
product familiarity; for a familiar product, m is expected to be 
close to one and for an unfamiliar product, significantly below 
one. 
We assume each consumer knows their own tastes, as de- 
scribed by v and m. However, heterogeneity in these tastes 
exists. Specifically, the value v is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed within the consumer population from zero to V. The 
probability of a match, m, is for simplicity assumed to be 
identical for all consumers and to be known by the seller. The 
market size is normalized to one. 
The product may be returned, "no-questions-asked." That is, 
the judgment of whether the product meets the customer's 
needs is purely subjective. Consumers may behave in an 
opportunistic fashion, in which they return the product even 
when it is a match. If the product is returned, the seller offers 
the consumer a partial refund (on the price), rP, where r is the 
proportion of the price refunded (partial refund rate), and 1 - r  is 
the nonrefundable proportion. Consumers also incur the cost of 
returning the product, R, that  captures time, effort and 
reshipping expenses. The seller obtains some salvage value, S, 
from the returned item by selling it in a secondary market. We 
assume that the salvage value exceeds the cost of returning 
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(S>R), so that the return process is economically efficient. Mer- 
chandise costs are irrelevant for the analysis and are assumed 
for simplicity to be zero. 
After ordering the product, a consumer tries it to discover if it 
matches his/her needs. A proportion of the value, t, is extracted 
during the trial period, giving the consumer a utility tv if the 
product is a match and zero value if it is a mismatch. (For 
simplicity, we assume that t is exogenous. However, t could also 
be endogenous, as  it could depend on the opportunistic inten- 
tions of the customer.) The consumption value remaining after 
product trial is therefore (1-t)v for a match and zero for a 
mismatch. When t=O, the period is too short for the consumer to 
gain any utility during the trial, and when t= 1, the consumer 
can obtain full utility from the product during the trial period. 
An example of a product with a low t might be a pay-per-view 
movie through cable-television where the buyer is allowed to 
sample the first five minutes free of charge. On the other hand, a 
wedding gown will have a high t, because it is used for a once-in- 
a-lifetime occasion. 
This completes the specification of the ingredients of the 
model. The optimal partial-refund policy consists of the prod- 
uct's price and partial-refund rate that maximize profit from all 
consumer segments, as  explained next. 
3. Optimal Partial-Refund Policy 
One can envision the sequence of decisions within the frame- 
work of a three stage game (see Figure 1). First, the seller sets 
both purchase price and partial refund, taking into account 
predicted, subsequent customer behavior. Second, consumers 
decide whether to order the product. Third, after receiving and 
inspecting the product, consumers decide whether to buy the 
product (keep the product) or return it for a partial refund. To 
find a subgame perfect solution, we will first analyze the third 
stage of the game, given that consumers have already ordered 
the product. Then, we will analyze the decision to order (second 
stage), given the price and partial refund. Finally, we analyze the 
seller's decisions on profit-maximizing price and partial refund 
(first stage). 




Seller Sets Product f Order 
Price and Partial +Consumer \ f Mismatch 
Refund Rate 
Do Not Order Return 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Figure 1. Sequence of Decisions 
Stage 3: Buyer's Decision to Return the Product 
The seller faces two types of returns: mismatched returns 
(those coming from unfortunate consumers who judge, after 
purchase, that the product a mismatch) and opportunistic 
returns (those coming from consumers who return even when 
the product is a match). Since customers can return the product 
for any reason, the seller will not be able to identify 
opportunistic from mismatched returns. However, the seller will 
be able to control the size of the segments by understanding the 
consumers' behaviors as analyzed next. 
Mismatched Returns: The product is of no value to the 
consumer when a mismatch occurs. The gain from returning it 
is the partial-refund, rP, less returning costs, R. Therefore, a 
mismatched consumer will return the product if rP > R. We later 
show that this condition is satisfied for the optimal price. 
Opportunistic Returns: When a match occurs after product 
trial, the residual value is (1-t)v. The gain from returning the 
product is the partial refund, rP, less returning cost, R. 
Therefore, a well-matched consumer will return the product if 
and only if rP-R 2 ( 1-t) v or 
v 5 (rP - R)/( l -  t). (1) 
Stage 2: The Decision to Order the Product 
Now consider the consumer's ordering decision in Stage 2. The 
consumer makes the ordering decision based on expected 
surplus. Knowing their own valuation of the matched good, v, 
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each consumer knows her/his own return intentions upon 
purchasing the product. Let v0 denote the value of the boundary 
person who is just indifferent between ordering and not ordering 
the product. All consumers with a v exceeding v0 will order the 
product (although some may later return it). We will examine the 
interesting case where the  boundary person r e tu rns  
opportunistically. 
Let us  identify the boundary, opportunistic consumer who just 
barely benefits from ordering the product. The expected surplus 
of the boundary consumer, EUIvO], is obtained as follows. When 
there is match, the boundary person gains a value of tvO by 
using the product during trial. When returning the product to 
the seller, the boundary person loses the nonrefundable portion 
of price, (1-r)P, and the returning cost, R. When there is a 
mismatch, the boundary person also returns the product, 
incurring a cost of (1-r)P+R with no benefit. Therefore, the 
expected surplus of the boundary consumer is 
EU[vO] = m[tv" - (1 - r)P - R] - (1 - m)[(l - r)P + R]. (2) 
To induce the boundary customer to order the product, the 
retailer must provide nonnegative surplus. To maximize profits, 
zero surplus must be provided. Setting EUIvO] = 0 and solving for 
vO, we get 
We can identify, from equation (3), the demand for orders and, 
from inequality (I) ,  the number of opportunistic returns as  a 
function of the seller's price and partial-refund rate. 
Expected Number of Orders: A consumer will order the product 
if v 2 vO. Given the uniform distribution of v, the number of 
products ordered, O(P,r), is the area to the right of v0 in Figure 2. 
(1 - r)P + R 
Orders = O(P, r) = 1 - 
mtV 
The number of orders is  a d'ecreasing function of the  
nonrefundable portion of the price, (1-r)P, and the return cost, 
R. 
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Figure 2. Partition of Consumers 
Expected Mismatched and Opportunistic Returners: Two types 
of returns occur in our model: mismatched returns, those that 
occur when the product is a mismatch, and opportunistic 
returns, those that occur even when the product is a match. 
Expected Mismatched Returns: A customer will return a 
mismatched product if rP>R. The expected number of 
mismatched returns, MR(P,r), is the probability of a mismatch 
multiplied by the number of orders. Using (4), we obtain 
(1 - r)P + R Mismatched Returns = MR(P, r) = ](I - m). (5) 
Expected Opportunistic Returns: A consumer will return 
opportunistically if there is a good match and condition (1) above 
holds. The probability of a match is m, and the number of 
consumers who value the product enough to order (v2v0) ,  but 
not enough to keep it (inequality 1) leads to the expected 
number of opportunistic returns: 
rP - R (1 - r)P + R 
Opportunistic Returns = OR(P, r) = m -- [ 1 - t  mt 
Since total re turns  equal mismatched returns  plus 
opportunistic returns, equations (5) and (6) yield the expected 
total number of returns, TR(P, r): 
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Total Returns = TR(P ,  r )  = MR(P, r )  + OR(P,  r )  
Expected Number of Buyers: The expected number of buyers 
equals number of orders less total returns. Using equations (4) 
and (7 ) ,  we obtain 
Expected Buyers = B(P ,  r )  = O(P,  r )  - TR(P ,  r )  = m 1 - --- ( ) (8) 
The expected demand of buyers is an inverse function of the 
refund less return costs, rP-R. If this increases, it becomes more 
attractive to return opportunistically. 
Stage 1: Setting Price and Partial-Refund 
At Stage 1 of the game, the seller chooses P and r to maximize 
expected profit. The expected profits can be expressed as expec- 
ted profit from buyers plus expected profit from returners. 
Expected profit from buyers is the number of buyers, B(P,r) ,  
multiplied. by the price, P, and expected' profit from returners is 
total returns, TR(P,r ) ,  multiplied by both the nonrefundable 
portion of price and the salvage value. Therefore, expected profit 
as a function of P and r is 
Expected Profit = n ( P ,  r )  = B(P ,  r)P + TR(P ,  r ) [ ( l  - r)P + S ]  
The seller optimizes the partial-refund policy by choosing P 
and r to maximize the expected profit function ( 9 ) .  Straight- 
forward calculus yields the optimal values (PC, r*) reported in the 
partial-refund column of Table 2 (note that P P > R  as required at 
Stage 3). The equilibrium values of orders, total returns, buyers, 
and profit were obtained by substituting (PC, i r) into equations 
(4)-(9) .  The optimal full-refund policy is obtained by maximizing 
the profit function with respect to price P under the constraint 
that the refund is full. r= 1. 
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Table 2. Partial Refund Versus Full Refund 
Assuming mtV > S + R 
Variable 
-- pp 
Partial Full Larger 
Refund Refund Value 
Price, P [(I- t ) v + m t v ] / z  [ ( I - ~ ) v + s + R I / ~  Partial 
Refund Rate, r 
Orders, 0 
Buyers, B 






Opportunistic rnt+l-t IS-R)- l+  rnt(S-R)-211-tJR Full 
Returns, OR 2 r ( l - t ) v  rnt(1-t)v 1 
Profit, x Partial 
4. Comparing Partial Refund to Full Refund 
The nonrefundable charge can be viewed as a rent for trying 
the product. Therefore, one can view renting (ordering with the 
intention to always return) and buying (ordering with the 
intention to keep a well-matched product) a s  customer 
alternatives. When the rent-for-trial-use is zero (under a full- 
refund policy), customers find it attractive to return opportuni- 
stically. 
The partial refund imposes a rent-for-trial-use which gives 
customers a larger incentive to substitute buying for renting. On 
the other hand, the rent is also paid by consumers who return 
honestly mismatched items, so the nonrefundable portion of 
price cannot be too high. The optimal partial refund takes this 
tradeoff into account. Partial refunds control opportunistic 
returns by consumers, but as seen in Table 2, opportunism is 
not eliminated if the salvage value exceeds the cost of return, 
(SR) - 
Requiring the optimal partial refund to be less than one gives 
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the following result. 
Result 1. A partial refund is more profitable than a full refund policy if 
m t v - R > S .  (10) 
Condition (10) implies that partial refunds will be optimal in 
si tuations where opportunistic behavior i s  attractive to 
consumers. That is, opportunistic returns are likely to be 
substantial when the product is likely to be a good match (large 
rn), when the value extracted during trial is large (large t), and 
when the product is valuable relative to the cost of returning it 
to the seller (when V is large relative to R). In addition, a partial- 
refund policy is less essential for controlling opportunism when 
the seller can salvage the returned item (large S) .  Since our 
interest is in exploring the return policy when opportunistic 
returns are of concern, we assume that condition (10) holds for 
the remainder of the paper. 
Table 2 contrasts partial- and full-refund policies under the 
assumption of inequality (10). Many of the comparisons are 
obvious: a full-refund policy leads to more orders, more total 
returns, and more opportunistic returns. However, a surprising 
results is the following. 
Result 2. A seller who offers only a partial refund charges a higher price 
than one that offers full refunds for returned merchandise. 
One might expect that a seller who refuses to refund 100% of 
the price of returned merchandise would be forced to compen- 
sate customers by pricing the product lower. This intuition is 
wrong. A full-refund policy limits the seller's incentive to raise 
price because higher prices encourage opportunistic returns. 
Under a partial-refund policy, however, the seller can raise price 
because the  nonrefundable portion of price discourages 
opportunistic returns. A consequence of this is that the number 
of buyers (consumers who do not return their orders) is identical 
whether the seller offers partial or full refunds. 
Table 3 provides comparative static results of the optimal 
partial refund. The intuition for the signs follows. 
Increase in product familiarity (larger rn): When a product is more 
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Table 3. Comparative Statics of Partial Refund Policy 
Probability Trial Salvage Returning Maximum 
Match, rn Period, t Value, S Costs, R Value, V 
Price, P + - 0 0 + 
Partial Refund Rate, r* - - + + - 
familiar to consumers, the probability of a good match increases, 
and so does the consumer's basic expected utility from 
opportunistic behavior (renting) and buying. The seller uses this 
opportunity to raise the selling price and lower the refund rate 
(increase the rent). 
Increase in the trial period (larger t): When the trial period 
increases, opportunistic returns become more attractive to 
consumers relative to buying. To discourage excessive returns, 
the seller decreases the refund rate, and lowers the price. The 
lower price helps generate more orders and makes the reward 
from returns less attractive. 
Increase in salvage value (higher S): When the seller's salvage 
value increase, returns hurt less. Therefore the seller increases 
the generosity of the return policy by increasing the refund. 
Increase in returning cost (higher R): The total expense to 
consumers of returning a product is the nonrefundable charge 
plus the returning cost, R. A higher R increases the total cost, 
and returning the product becomes less attractive compared to 
keeping it. Therefore the need to discourage opportunistic 
behavior is lower, and the seller can increase the refund. 
Increase in maximum product value (higher V): An increase in 
maximum product value enlarges the population's basic 
willingness-to-pay, so buying and renting become more valuable. 
The seller captures the opportunity by raising price. However, 
the higher price would also encourage opportunistic returns. To 
offset excessive returns, the refund rate is reduced. 
In the next section, we discuss special cases of partial refunds 
and provide empirical evidence for their existence. 
5. Do Sellers Use Partial Refunds? 
Do partial refunds exist in practice? Two observed formats are 
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restocking charges and nonrefundable shipping and handling 
charges. We consider them in turn. 
Restocking Fees: Retailers of computer components accept 
returns, but many retain a percentage of the original price to 
cover the costs of "restocking." Table 4 shows restocking fees 
collected from twenty mail-order computer dealers, drawn 
randomly from the October 1996 issue of Computer Buying 
Guide and Handbook. As can be seen, 60% of the dealers have 
restocking fees, and therefore only provide partial refunds. Table 
4 reports the partial refunds based on restocking fees, not 
taking into account shipping and handling charges, a s  
considered next. 
Nonrefundable Shipping and Handling Charges: Many retail- 
ers do not refund shipping and handling charges (Hess, Chu, 
and Gerstner, 1996). Therefore, the partial refund as a percent- 
age of the total computer expenditure is actually smaller than 
the reported percentages in Table 4. Our model already incorpo- 
rates the possibility of nonrefundable shipping and handling 
charges. The refundable price, rP, could be thought of as the list 
price, and the nonrefundable price, (1-r)P, could be thought of 
as the shipping and handling charges. 
Consider Table 5, which is based on data collected from 
apparel catalogers. We requested a catalog from all mail-order 
Table 4. Restocking Fees and Partial Refunds 
Restocking Fee Partial ~efund '  Number of 















Total = 20 
1 The partial-refund percent is  actually lower because the retailers do not 
refund shipping and handling charges, a s  is discussed below. 
2 The following companies were included in the survey: Anson, Arbor Computer, 
Astra Technology, Computer Palace, Dee One Systems, Elek-Tek, Envision 
One Systems, Envision, Insight Computers, Magic PC, Micro X Press, Micron 
Electronics, MMI Corporation, O.S. Computers, PC's Complete, Price Pointe, 
Renegade Systems, Technology Distribution, Top Data, US Computer, and 
Wonderex. 
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clothing retailers identified in the October issue of Consumer 
Reports,  and twenty-seven responded. Twenty-four of the 
catalogs listed shipping and handling charges as a function of 
the order value, and the other three determine the shipping 
charge by weight. Table 5 gives the percentages of companies 
that refund shipping and handling and the percentage of those 
refunding return costs (reshipping expenses). Roughly 90% of 
the apparel catalogers do not refund shipping and handling, 
70% do not compensate for return costs, and more than two- 
thirds of the sellers refund neither shipping and handling char- 
ges nor return costs. A true, full money-back policy in which all 
the consumer out-of-pocket costs are refunded constitute only 
7% of the sample (see upper left cell of Table 5). 
Table 6 shows the listed shipping and handling charges of the 
twenty four catalogs for a $100 order, and the partial refund as 
a percent of total price (list price plus shipping and handling 
charges). The partial-refund percents vary from 89 percent to 96 
percent. 
Computer and clothing are representative of many direct- 
marketing industries. We find that: 
Table 5. Refund Policies of Apparel Mail-Order Sellers 
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Table 6. Nonrefundable Shipping and Handling Charges and Partial 
Refunds 
Company List Shipping & Total Partial 
Price ($1 Handling ($) Price ($) Refund* (%) 
Victoria's Secret 100 11.95 111.95 89 
Bloomingdales 100 8.95 108.95 92 
Neiman Marcus 100 1 1 .OO 111.00 90 
Brownstone Studio 100 9.95 109.95 9 1 
J. Peterman Co. 100 1 1.90 111.90 89 
Brooks Brothers 100 9.00 109.00 92 
Cheyenne Outfitters 100 9.95 109.95 9 1 
Talbots 100 8.50 108.50 92 
Bachrach 100 7.25 107.25 93 
Willow Ridges 100 8.50 108.50 92 
Bedford Fair 100 8.50 108.50 92 
Lerner NY 100 8.95 108.95 92 
Eddie Bauer 100 9.95 109.95 9 1 
J. Crew 100 7.90 107.90 93 
Huntington Clothiers 100 8.00 108.00 93 
International Male 100 9.50 109.50 93 
Clifford of Willis 100 7.95 107.95 93 
Norm Thompson 100 8.50 108.50 92 
James River Traders 100 6.95 107.95 93 
Lands' End 100 6.95 106.95 94 
L'eggs Shwcs of Sav. 100 5.99 105.99 95 
Patagonia 100 5.50 105.50 95 
Orvis 100 4.95 104.95 96 
LL Bean 100 4.50 104.50 94 
Many mail-order sellers use a partial-refund policy, implemented either 
in the form of nonrefundable shipping and handling charges or restocking 
fees. 
Unlike mail-order companies, traditional stores do not charge 
nonrefundable fees and may be more vulnerable to abusive 
returns. Perhaps this is why their complaints about excessive 
returns are heard louder (Longo, 1995 and Neuborne, 1996). 
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6. Conclusions 
Although many retailers claim to offer 100% money-back 
guarantees, a more careful examination of these policies reveal 
that, frequently, only partial refunds are offered. We showed that 
partial refunds help mitigate the problem of abusive product 
returns experienced by retailers who accept returns, "no- 
questions-asked." Without such policies, too many consumers 
would use products for a limited time, rent-free, before they are 
returned for a refund. 
Under partial refunds, products are both sold and rented by 
the retailer. The nonrefundable portion of the price is a rent paid 
by those who return products. Since buying and renting the 
product are substitute options from the point-of-view of the 
consumers, the seller can control their choices by designing the 
selling price and partial-refund rate optimally. The nonrefund- 
able portion should not be too high because mismatched 
consumers pay a rent even though they do not receive any value 
from trial use of the product. Forcing them to pay a rental fee 
would significantly reduce the number of orders. 
The model presented was designed to determine the optimal 
partial-refund policy, including as a special case, a full-refund 
policy. The seller's price and profits will generally be higher with 
partial refunds, compared to full refunds. Partial refunds reduce 
the number of orders, but have no impact on the number of 
buyers because they also reduce the amount of returned 
merchandise. That is, partial refunds improve the quality of the 
typical order, while reducing the quantity of such orders. 
Consider some of the model's assumptions and limitations. We 
assumed that production unit cost is zero and that consumers' 
willingness to pay for the product is uniformly distributed across 
consumers. We believe that relaxing these assumptions will not 
change the nature of our results for many retail scenarios. First, 
production costs in our model are sunk costs, and the seller's 
decision of whether to offer money-back guarantees depends on 
the size of the salvage value relative to the reshipping costs, not 
on unit production cost. Second, the consumer's decision of 
whether to buy or rent is driven, among other things, by the 
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product value. Figure 2 illustrates that renters will be consum- 
ers with a relatively low willingness to pay, and that as long as 
the distribution of consumers' values is adequately diverse, 
partial refunds with renters are likely to prevail in equilibrium, 
independent of the exact shape of the distribution. 
We presented empirical evidence to show that partial refunds 
exist in the form of nonrefundable shipping and handling 
charges and restocking fees. Restocking fees are much less 
common. One explanation for this is that shipping charges are a 
more subtle way to screen for credible orders than the more 
transparent restocking fees. Consumers may think that shipping 
charges are designed to cover legitimate shipping and handling 
costs, while actual restocking costs are thought to be trivial. 
Therefore, consumers may be more receptive to shipping charges 
than to restocking fees. 
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